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MAJOR CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF
THE AFDC PROGRAM SINCE 1935*
Irene Luriet
Cash benefits provided by federal, state, and local government
income maintenance programs in the United States amounted to
$83 billion in 1972.1 The four public assistance programs, financed
by all three levels of government, together with the general assis-
tance programs, financed solely by the states and localities, ac-
counted for $11 billion of these expenditures; Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), one of the four public assistance
programs, made cash payments of $7 billion.2 Yet while AFDC is
only a small component of the total income maintenance system, it
is the focus of substantial controversy.
AFDC is criticized as being both inadequate and inequitable,
and many critics argue that AFDC has increased dependency on
welfare by encouraging marital instability, migration to urban
ghettoes, and withdrawal from the labor force. 3 On the other hand,
* The research reported herein was supported in part by funds granted to the Institute
for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, by the Office of Economic
Opportunity pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2994 (1970). The author is solely responsible for the conclusions.
' Assistant Professor of Economics, Union College. B.A. Barnard College 1963; Ph.D.
University of California, Berkeley 1969.
1 Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance accounted for half of these
expenditures, railroad and public employee retirement accounted for $14.6 billion, pay-
ments to veterans totalled $6.3 billion, unemployment benefits totalled $5.7 billion, and
workmen's coompensation and temporary disability benefits amounted to $3.4 billion. 36
Soc. SEC. BULL., Oct. 1973 at 48.
2 Old Age Assistance payments were $1.9 billion, payments under Aid to the Perma-
nently and Totally Disabled were $1.4 billion, Aid to the Blind amounted to $106 million,
and general assistance payments were $741 million. Id. at 70.
1 Much of this criticism stems from the extremely rapid growth of the program over the
past decade. From 1960 to 1972, the number of AFDC recipients rose from 3 million to 1
million and payments increased almost seven-fold. Id. at 69-70. This increase has raised many
questions in the minds of the public, Congress, and scholars concerning the structure of the
program and has created severe disagreements over the appropriate changes which should
be made. Yet while there is much rhetoric about a crisis in welfare, and many policies
proposed on the basis of this rhetoric, too little is known about the causes of the increase in
welfare dependency.
. Broadly speaking, there are three sets of factors which could explain ihe growth of the
AFDC program: (1) changes in people's behavior concerning family formation and dissolu-
tion, fertility, work effort, migration, and the decision to apply for welfare; (2) changes in
aggregate economic conditions which affect the financial position of low income people; and
(3) changes in the structure of the program made by legislatures, courts, and welfare
departments at all levels of governments.
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the major changes in the structure of AFDC have had the effect of
liberalizing the program considerably. A very brief account of the
origin of the AFDC program is provided in section I. Section II
describes the changes in the criteria used to determine whether a
family is eligible for AFDC, and section III describes changes in the
rules used to compute payments. In recent years, social services
and training have been provided along with money payments, and
these programs are discussed in section IV. The last section
analyzes some of the problems involved in administering the AFDC
program.
I
THE MOTHERS' PENSION MOVEMENT
AFDC grew out of the mothers' pension movement of the
early twentieth century. Until the mothers' pension laws, children
who could not be supported by their widowed, disabled, or de-
serted parent were placed in institutions. At the turn of the
century, it was realized that children would receive better care by
remaining with their mother if she provided a good home. In
1909, President Theodore Roosevelt called the White House Con-
ference on the Care of Dependent Children which stressed the
importance of home life for children and recommended that aid be
given to maintain suitable homes for the rearing of children. The
Conference stimulated a variety of children's organizations,
women's organizations, parent-teacher associations, labor unions,
and other groups to lobby for mothers' pensions in state legisla-
tures. Missouri and Illinois enacted the first legislation in 1911, and
other states followed with unusual speed. By 1920, there were
mothers' pension laws in forty-one states, and by the end of 1931,
mothers' pension acts had been passed in all states except Georgia
and South Carolina.4 In 1934, an estimated 109,000 families and
280,000 children were receiving approximately $37.5 million in
aid. The average payment per family was approximately $29 per
month.5
The Depression increased the need for pensions, but local
governments, which financed the program in the majority of states,
faced a severe shortage of funds and consequently were forced to
curtail assistance expenditures. The federal government responded
" A. EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 624-29 (1938).
p. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 186-87 (1936).
[Vol. 59:825
CHANGES IN AFDC
with the Social Security Act of 19356 which, in addition to establish-
ing Old Age and Survivors Insurance and unemployment insur-
ance, provided for grants to be made to the states so that they
could continue to give aid to families with children. While the
federal government assumed some of the cost of Aid to Dependent
Children, as it was then called,7 responsibility for designing and
administering the program remained with the state and local
governments. Congress gave relatively little attention to AFDC in
drafting the Social Security Act, anticipating that a fully developed
social security program would provide for widows and orphans and
that the need for AFDC would "wither away."
II
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The Social Security Act of 1935 defined a dependent child as
a child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued
absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a
parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother, ... in a place of residence maintained by one or
more of such relatives as his or their own home."
While the definition of a dependent child has not changed
significantly, other changes have considerably broadened the
coverage of the programY The age limitation has been gradually
raised from under sixteen to under twenty-one years of age if the
child is regularly attending school. 10 The needs of the relative with
whom the child is living may be taken into account in determining
the amount of the payment to the family." Since 1962, states have
been permitted, but not required, to give aid to the spouse of the
relative with whom the child is living. 2 In 1961, states were given
the option of extending aid to children who met the eligibility
requirements for Aid to Dependent Children but who had been
6 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1 3 96g (1970)).
Aid to Dependent Children became Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 1962.
See Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(2), 76 Stat. 185 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602 (1970)).
s Ch. 531, § 406(a), 49 Stat. 629.
For descriptions of the program in its early years, see E. BURNS, THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (1949), and L. MERIAM, RELIEF AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1946).
10 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1970).
1 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(1) (1970).
12 Id.
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placed in foster homes or child care institutions.' 3 The 1967
amendments made the extension of AFDC to these children man-
datory on the states. 4 Finally, in 1968, the Emergency Assistance
program was added to AFDC in an attempt to meet the immediate
needs of a family in a crisis. 15 This was an important addition to
the program, since the regular AFDC application procedure pre-
cludes immediate payments.' 6 Emergency Assistance is intended to
be a stop-gap measure for an indigent family; therefore, the
eligibility criteria are rather broad and open to liberal
interpretation.' 7
Until 1961, aid could be provided only to families which were
poor because of the death, disability, or absence of the primary
earner. In response to the 1960-61 recession, the federal law was
amended so that states, if they desired, also could provide aid to
families with children which were poor because of the unemployment
of a parent.' This addition marked a significant deviation from
the previous objective of AFDC, which was to provide aid only to
families which were incapable of supporting themselves. The 1967
amendments restricted the unemployed parent provision to unem-
ployed fathers.' 9 States still are not required to extend aid to
'3 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 2, 75 Stat. 76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608
(1970)).
14 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. II, § 208(a), 81 Stat. 892 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(20) (1970)).
15 Id. § 206(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970)).
16 S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 165-66 (1967). Under the normal application
procedure for AFDC, the local agency must make an eligibility determination not in excess
of 30 days after receipt of the application. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(1)-(5) (1973). Emergency
Assistance includes cash grants and payments in kind (social services and medical assistance)
and is available to any "needy child" under the age of 21 who is living with a relative if the
child has no "available resources" and the assistance is "necessary to avoid destitution." 42
U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970). In addition, the state of destitution must not be the result of the
child's or the relative's refusal of employment or training without good cause. Id. The
program is also designed to cover migrant workers if the state so chooses. Id. § 606(e)(2).
Finally, a family unit can rely upon Emergency Assistance for only one month in any
consecutive 12-month period. Id. § 606(e)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(3) (1973). This would
seem to be in accordance with the congressional intent to meet only a family's immediate
emergency needs which cannot be covered by the regular AFDC cash grant services. See S.
REP. No. 744, supra note 16, at 165-66. If the needs of the family continue beyond the
Emergency Assistance period, the unit should have a determination on its application for
regular AFDC assistance.
18 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607
(1970)).
19 Fathers are defined as unemployed if they work less than 100 hours a month. Fathers
must be unemployed for 30 days and must meet a specified test of recent and substantial
attachment to the labor force. They cannot be receiving unemployment insurance and must
be registered with the state employment office. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100 (1973). The Supreme
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unemployed fathers, and only twenty-four had an unemployed
father segment of AFDC in mid-1973, providing aid to a total of
113,000 families.20
Since the early days of the program, states have considered a
family's assets in determining its need for assistance.2 1 The amount
of assets which recipients were permitted to hold varied considera-
bly, as it does today. All states permit recipients to own the house in
which they are living, and the majority of states .set no maximum
on the value of the house. It is difficult to generalize about the
other asset limitations. Many states exempt personal effects, au-
tomobiles, and income-producing property such as tools, equip-
ment, and livestock. The limit on the value of other assets varies
from about $150 to $3,000, with a median limit of about $1,000. If
families have assets in excess of these amounts, they are ineligible
for AFDC until they liquidate their excess assets and consume the
proceeds.22
Certain eligibility requirements are imposed not so much to
define the eligible population as to restrict or mold its behavior.
AFDC payments inherently provide an incentive for the poor to
alter their behavior-to migrate, withdraw from the labor force,
desert their families, and have children. To counteract these incen-
tives, governments have imposed residence and work requirements
and have required that women take legal steps to obtain support
from deserting fathers. Some of these restrictions are imposed by
the federal government and some by the states, with the result that
the restrictions, and the strictness with which they are enforced,
vary from one jurisdiction to another.
The Social Security Act of 1935 prohibited a state from requir-
ing that residents live in the state for more than one year before
applying for assistance.23 This maximum became the standard rule,
and in the mid-1960's, when the durational residence requirement
was being successfully challenged in the courts, four-fifths of the
Court, in Davidson v. Francis, 409 U.S. 904 (1972), affirmed a lower court's holding that
states may provide benefits to workers who are on strike or who have been dismissed for
misconduct. But see Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 878 (1974).
20 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Public Assistance Statistics May 1973,
Sept. 10, 1973, table 8 (NCSS Report A-2).
2 The 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act required states, in determining
need, to take into consideration any other income and resources of any child claiming aid to
dependent children. For some examples of states' asset limitations in 1940, see L. MERIAM,
supra note 9, at 59-60.
22 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF
STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1973).
23 Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 351, § 402(b), 49 Stat. 627.
1974]
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states imposed a requirement of one year. 4 The durational resi-
dence requirement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,25 on the ground that it violated the
equal protection clause by depriving welfare recipients of their
right to travel. 26 Following this decision, New York, Connecticut,
Colorado, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia passed
"emergency" residence requirements, arguing that they were
necessary to prevent financial catastrophe resulting from rising
welfare costs. The Court held these laws unconstitutional in 1972.
Several restrictions are placed on the mother's behavior toward
the father of her children and other men. In 1950, the Act was
amended to require states to "provide for prompt notice to ap-
propriate law-enforcement officials of the furnishing of aid to
families with dependent children in respect to a child who has been
deserted or abandoned by a parent. ' 28  The law-enforcement
agency then has the opportunity, if it wishes, of trying to obtain a
financial contribution from the father. Given the importance of
desertion in causing families to qualify for AFDC, it is not surpris-
ing that some attempt is made to induce the father to support his
family. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that eligibility is often
contingent upon a mother's naming a man whom, for personal
reasons, she may have no desire to see prosecuted.
The 1967 amendments increased the ability of the states to
secure support from parents of AFDC children. States are required
to establish a program for determining the paternity of illegitimate
children and for securing support for these children and for
children who have been deserted. 9 The state welfare agencies are
to make cooperative arrangements with the appropriate courts and
law enforcement officials for accomplishing this function. States are
24 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF
STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1967).
25 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
26 The statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than one year is a
classification constituting an "invidious discrimination" denying the plaintiffs the equal
protection of the law. The Court in Shapiro recognized a legitimate state interest in
safeguarding against the fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits, but refused to accept means
which inhibit the migration of needy persons into a state. Id. at 629, 630-33. The implication
of this decision, in its broadest construction, is that any state regulation that impinges on the
so-called basic constitutional right of freedom to travel would be illegal.
2 7 E.g., Dunn v. Rivera, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972), affg mem. 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn.
1971).
21 Act of Aug. 28, 1950, ch. 809, tit. III, § 321(a), 64 Stat. 549 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(1 1) (1970)). This provision is discussed in detail in M. MCKEANY, THE ABSENT
FATHER AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE PROGRAM OF AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1960).
29 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17), (18) (1970).
830 [Vol. 59:825
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also required to increase their efforts to find parents against whom
a court order has been issued or a petition for an order of support
has been filed.30 They must submit the names of these parents to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The
Internal Revenue Service will then assist HEW in finding the
addresses of these parents. 31
This legislation has not been very effective in securing support
from absent parents. In 1971, only thirteen percent of AFDC
families received child support or alimony payments. 32 One expla-
nation for this result is the lack of financial incentives to spur either
the families or the local governments to secure support. AFDC
payments are reduced by a dollar for every dollar of support from
absent parents, so that support payments do not increase a family's
total income. And since local governments finance a relatively small
share of AFDC expenditures, an extra dollar of support means a
relatively small cost savings to them.
The mothers' pension acts restricted aid to families which
provided a good environment for the children. This tradition has
had a significant impact on the eligibility requirements for AFDC,
for it has provided a rationale for denying aid to certain families.
In the 1950's, when the number of blacks and illegitimate children
receiving AFDC began to rise rapidly, "suitable homes" provisions
were developed by some states to deny aid to families with illegiti-
mate children.33 Defining a home as unsuitable if it contained
illegitimate children both imposed sanctions on unacceptable moral
behavior and excluded a disproportionate number of blacks from
the program. This rule came under sharp attack in the early
1960's, and it is no longer used to deny aid to illegitimate children.
Ten states still require that the home be suitable, but suitability is
defined in terms of the quality of care received, not a child's
legitimacy. 34
A variant of the "suitable homes" provision was the "substitute
parent" policy which evolved in some states. "Substitute parent"
rules prohibited an able-bodied father or any other man from
living, or sometimes spending too much time, with the mother.35
30 Id. § 602(a)(21).
31 Id. § 610(a).
32 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, FINDINGS OF THE 1971 AFDC STUDY,
PART II, FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES table 62 (1971).
3' For a detailed discussion of the suitable homes policies, see W. BELL, AID TO
DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
34 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 22, at 20, 36, 40, 48, 50,
52, 54, 58, 70, 74.
35 For a discussion of substitute parent policies, see W. BELL, .upra note 33.
1974]
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This was usually done by defining a man in the house as a
"substitute parent" even though he was neither the mother's hus-
band nor the father of the children. The children were then not
considered dependent because they were not "deprived of parental
support or care by reason of the . . . continued absence from the
home . . . of a parent. '36 These rules came under repeated attack
for infringing the civil liberties of the mother and for impeding her
attempts to establish a relationship with a man who eventually
could eliminate her need for welfare.
The validity of the "substitute parent" rule came before the
Supreme Court in King v. Smith.3 7 The Court found that an
Alabama regulation denied AFDC payments to the children of a
mother who "cohabit[ed]" in or outside her home with any single
or married able-bodied man,3 8 thereby denying aid to an otherwise
eligible needy child because his "substitute parent" was not absent
from the home. The Court held that the state's interest in dis-
couraging immorality and illegitimacy was not a relevant criterion
on which to predicate the grant or denial of benefits; therefore, it
was not a proper justification for AFDC disqualification. 39 Finally,
the Court pointed out that Congress has determined that immoral-
ity and illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative
measures rather than measures which punish dependent children,
and that the method used by Alabama conflicted with the Social
Security Act.40 The decision affected eighteen other states and the
District of Columbia, all of which had some version of the man-in-
the-house rule.
In Lewis v. Martin,4' the Court went a step further and ruled
against the "man assuming the role of spouse" rule. Under this
regulation, the income of a man who is married to or cohabiting
with an AFDC mother is counted in determining the family's need
for welfare, even if he is not legally obligated to support her
children.4' The Court decided that, in the absence of proof of
actual contribution, a state may not consider a child's resources to
include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not
legally obligated to support the child or the income of a man
assuming the role of spouse, whatever the nature of his obligation
36 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1970).
37 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
38 Id. at 311.
39 Id. at 313, 320, 326-27.
40 Id. at 327-33.
41 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
42 Id. at 553-54.
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to support.43 The case was decided on statutory grounds, not on
broad constitutional ones.
The states have long been concerned that AFDC recipients
might take unjustified advantage of the program by reducing their
work efforts. Many have required that recipients accept jobs if they
are available, some specifying that the jobs must be "suitable" or
"reasonable" and that child care arrangements must be available."
Some states have used this work requirement not only to lower
welfare expenditures, but also to guarantee an ample supply of
short-term labor, particularly during harvest time.45
In 1968, as the AFDC caseload expanded rapidly, Congress
amended the Social Security Act to increase the incentives for
recipients to seek employment. The amendments (1) reduced the
tax rate on earnings implicit in the AFDC benefit schedule, (2)
established the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, a manpower pro-
gram designed specifically for AFDC recipients, and (3) required
that the states refer all "appropriate" recipients to the WIN
program. 46 Except for the explicit exclusion of (1) children under
sixteen, or over sixteen and attending school, (2) people old, ill, or
incapacitated or who live far from a WIN program, and (3) people
needed in the home because of the illness or incapacity of someone
in the household, "appropriate" recipients were not defined.47
Unemployed fathers were to be given first priority for referral.
Although the law did not require that mothers be referred to the
WIN program, the states could impose such a requirement pro-
vided that adequate day care was available. If an appropriate
recipient refused, without good cause, to participate in a WIN
program or to accept a job, that individual was to be excluded in
determining the amount of the family's AFDC benefit. The rest of
the family, however, was to remain eligible for AFDC. 48
A casual reading of the legislation would suggest that many
adult recipients would be referred for WIN, but the requirement
43 Id. at 559-60.
44 In 1967, 24 states had some sort of a work requirement. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 24.
45 For an account of how welfare has been used to provide a source of low-wage labor,
see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWVARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
(1971).
41 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. II, §§ 202(b), 444(a),(b), 81 Stat. 881,
884-89, 890 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602 (a)(8), (19), 630-44 (1970)).
47 Id. § 444(b)(19)(A)(iv)-(vii) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(iv)-(vii) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972)).
48 45 C.F.R. § 233.11(d) (1973). The family unit still receives aid, but the amount of aid
will be reduced since the standard of need for the unit is reduced.
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that welfare agencies refer only those recipients judged "ap-
propriate" has resulted in widely differing policies and probably a
lower rate of referral than that anticipated by the framers of the
law. Only one-quarter of the recipients who have been assessed for
participation in WIN have been found appropriate for referral,49
and even fewer actually have been referred. As might be expected,
child care responsibilities and poor health have been the major
reasons for a recipient being found inappropriate. Of those per-
sons referred for WIN, less than three-fifths have actually enrolled
in the program, while the remainder have been referred back to
the welfare departments because they have been unsuitable, be-
cause slots have not been open, because they have failed to attend
interviews, or because they have refused to participate in the
program.5 0
Congressional disappointment with the WIN program stimu-
lated the so-called Talmadge amendment of 1971. 51 The amend-
ment requires that all AFDC mothers register for manpower ser-
vices, training, and employment with the Department of Labor,
except those who have children under six years of age or who are
ill, disabled, or caring for someone who is ill or disabled.52 Chil-
dren aged sixteen or more who are not in school are also required
to register as are all fathers. 53 In the first year of the new program,
the number of people required to register was estimated to be 1.2
million. 54
III
THE COMPUTATION OF AFDC PAYMENTS
The AFDC payments given to families who meet these eligibil-
ity requirements are determined by a complicated set of rules.
Some of the rules are made by the federal government and are
uniform nationwide, while others are made by the states and vary
considerably. Broadly speaking, benefits are computed by compar-
ing a family's "countable income" to a "cost standard," and by
paying all or a part of the difference between them. This section
'9 S. LEVITAN, M. REIN & D. MARWICK, WORK AND WELFARE Go TOGETHER 93-94 (1972).
50 Id. at 94-95.
" Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1972)). The amendment became effective on July 1, 1972.
52 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (Supp. II, 1972).
53 Id.
54 Hearings on the Work Incentive Program Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 51 (1972).
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will trace some of the changes that have occurred in the definition
of countable income, in the development of cost standards, and in
the methods used by some of the states to limit payments to less
than the difference between them.
A. The Definition of Countable Income
The countable income of a family is the total income
reported 55 by the family less specified amounts which can be
deducted, or "disregarded. ' 56 Prior to the 1967 amendments, the
income of AFDC recipients was disregarded only in limited circum-
stances and generally at the option of the states. In 1962, states
were given the option of permitting "all or any portion of the
earned or other income to be set aside for future identifiable needs
of a dependent child."5 In 1965, states were permitted to disre-
gard $5 of income per month in computing the AFDC benefit.
They were also given the option of disregarding the earnings of
children up to $50 per child and $150 per household per month.5 8
States were required to disregard work expenses, although they
were left with responsibility for determining what may be counted
as a work expense. 59 Finally, some income of AFDC recipients was
disregarded according to the requirements of other programs,
including the Economic Opportunity Act,60 the Manpower De-
velopment and Training Act,6 1 and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act.62
The 1967 amendments lowered the tax on the earnings of
55 All of a family's earnings and property income must be reported. Families must also
report transfer income in cash or kind from private sources and cash payments from
governments. In-kind transfers from governments such as the benefits from food stamps,
public housing, and Medicaid are not reported as income. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1973).
51 The amount of income which may be disregarded is one of the primary determinants
of the "tax rate" on income implicit in the AFDC payment schedule. The tax rate is the rate
at which payments are reduced as income increases. When some of an increase in income is
disregarded, the AFDC payment is reduced by less than the total increase in income.
Disregards, in other words, lower the tax rate on income. The other determinant of the tax
rate is the method used by the state to limit payments to less than the difference between the
cost standard and countable income. These methods are discussed below. See notes 80-107
and accompanying text infra. For estimates of actual AFDC tax rates in 23 states see Lurie,
Estimates of Tax Rates in the AFDC Program, XXVII NAT'L TAX J. 93 (1974).
"T Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 188. As of 1973, 18
states had some sort of provision for exempting income for a child's future identifiable
needs, which were usually defined as education or training. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 22.
58 Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. IV, §§ 403(b), 410, 79 Stat. 418, 423.
59 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
Go Id. §§ 2701-2994.
61 Id. §§ 2571-2628.
62 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-2411, 3 31a, 332a, 332b, 821-887b (1970).
1974]
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AFDC recipients with the explicit objective of increasing the incen-
tive to work.63 The amendments require that the states disregard
the first $30 of a family's earnings and one-third of the remainder
each month in determining the amount of the payment. 64 No
limitation is placed on the amount of earnings which must be
subject to the one-third disregard. The amendments also require
that all of the earnings of a child attending school full time or a
part-time student who is not a full-time employee be disregarded
completely.6 5 The provisions of the law other than the Social
Security Act requiring that earnings be disregarded were made
ineffective. States could begin using the disregards immediately
and were required to use them by July 1969.
The "$30 and one-third" rule and the other earnings disre-
gards increased the AFDC payments made to families with
earnings.66 It also raised the earnings level at which a family's
benefit falls to zero, or the "break-even point. '6 7 Therefore, al-
:' See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
4 Id.
65 Id.
66 In other words, the increased disregards reduced the implicit tax rate on earnings.
Connecticut, for example, had a cost standard of $257 in 1967 and paid the entire
difference between this amount and a family's income. Payments were reduced by $1 for
every dollar increase in income, and income was therefore taxed at a 100% rate. The $30
and one-third disregard would reduce the tax rate to zero on the first $30 and 67% on the
remainder. Indiana, in comparison, had a cost standard of $271 for a family of four in 1967,
but paid a maximum of only $103. Before the amendments, a family would receive $103 if
its income was between zero and $168, implying a tax rate of zero on income within this
range. Beyond $168, the payment would be reduced $1 for every dollar increase in earnings,
implying a 100% tax on earnings. If the $30 and one-third disregard had been used with this
cost standard and maximum, a family would have received $103 if its earnings were between
zero and $282, implying a zero tax rate within that income range. Beyond $282, the
payment would be reduced by 67 cents for every dollar increase in earnings.
67 Furthermore, the earnings disregard raises the break-even point above the level of
the cost standard. In designing the 1967 amendments, Congress either could have provided
payments to all families whose income fell between the cost standard and the break-even
point or limited payments to certain families within this range. The House Ways and Means
Committee, in its Report on H.R. 12080 of August 7, 1967, stated that giving payments to all
families whose income fell between the cost standard and the break-even point would cost
$160 million a year more than the solution which was adopted. H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967). The solution, chosen in the interest of economy, was to specify in
the amendments that a family may not become eligible for AFDC until its income before
deducting $30 of earnings and one-third of the remainder falls below the cost standard.
The $30 and one-third disregard is used to determine the amount of a family's payment
but not its initial eligibility. The resulting inequity is that a family with a previous income
below the cost standard but a current income above it may receive benefits, while a family
with the same current income but no recent month with income below the cost standard
cannot receive benefits. Nor is the second family eligible for Medicaid, unless the state
provides Medicaid for the "medically needy." Families thus are provided an incentive for
reducing their income temporarily below the cost standard in order to establish eligibility.
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though they were designed to reduce welfare costs by increasing
recipients' financial incentive to work, the 1967 amendments had
the side effect of increasing the payments made to families with
earnings and increasing the income level at which families leave the
program. 68 Not surprisingly, this increase in the break-even point
was followed by rapid growth in the AFDC caseload.
Federal law places no limitations on the amount of income
subject to the $30 and one-third disregard in determining the
payment.69 The Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot im-
pose such a limitation, nor can they cut off payments at some gross
income level if this level is below the break-even point implied by
the $30 and one-third disregard.70 Some states, however, will not
make payments which are below some minimum amount in order
to avoid the relatively high administrative cost of keeping a family
on welfare when its benefit is small.
The 1967 amendments did not alter the requirement that
work expenses be taken into consideration in determining AFDC
payments.7 1 The issue that then arose was whether work expenses
should be deducted from earnings before or after the deduction of
$30 and one-third of remaining earnings. Under the federal indi-
vidual income tax, the expenses of earning income are deducted
from gross income in computing taxable income, which is consid-
ered the measure of the ability to pay taxes. If public assistance
were to follow the same rule and use income net of work expenses
as a measure of the need for welfare, work expenses would be
deducted from earnings before the deduction of $30 of earnings
The amendment attempts to discourage the deliberate reduction of income by prohibiting
the states from disregarding the earnings of persons who stop working or reduce their
earnings "without good cause." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(C) (2) (1970). This sanction has little
force, however, because persons who stop working have no earnings to disregard.
'8 There is a fixed relationship between the payment made to families with no income,
the tax rate on income, and the break-even point-the lower the tax rate, the higher the
break-even point. For a full discussion of this relationship, see C. GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES
AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 62-67 (1967).
69 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1970).
10 Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23, aff'g per curiam 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.NJ. 1971),
upheld this interpretation of the Social Security Act. At issue was New Jersey's "administra-
tive ceiling" regulation. The regulation provided, in effect, that when the "available adjusted
income" of a family exceeds a set amount, called the "administrative ceiling," the family is
declared to be ineligible for AFDC. NEw JERSEY CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE BUDGET MANUAL
§ 615 (1969-70). In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed a district court decision in
which the ceiling was held to be inconsistent with the Social Security Act because the state
did not deduct from income the $30 and one-third earnings disregard as set forth by the Act
and eligibility was determined on the basis of gross, instead of net, income. 404 U.S. at
23-24.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
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and one-third of the remainder. However, HEW issued regulations
requiring the states to deduct work expenses from earnings after
$30 and one-third of remaining earnings have been deducted. 2
Thus, 'in effect, recipients are completely reimbursed for their
work expenses. Payments calculated by deducting work expenses
from income after the deduction of the $30 and one-third disre-
gard will be greater than payments calculated by first deducting
work expenses, the excess being an amount equal to one-third of
work expenses.73 This excess can be substantial even when work
expenses are not unreasonably high,' 4 and several states were slow
to comply with the federal regulation concerning the treatment of
work expenses. By the end of 1971, however, all states were
obeying the regulation.
B. Methods of Limiting Payments
From the inception of the program, many states limited pay-
ments to less than the full difference between a family's countable
income and the total income which the state determined it needed
to achieve a satisfactory standard of living. A variety of methods
have been used. Until 1951, states were permitted to have waiting
lists for AFDC, and some families who were in need, according to
the criteria established by the states themselves, were given no
payments at all. 75 Since the early days of the program, some states
have imposed a maximum on the amount that could be paid to a
family, regardless of the difference between its income and need.7
72 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(i) (1973).
,3 For example, assume a recipient earns $90 per month and has work expenses of $9.
If the work expenses are deducted first, the recipient will have $56 of his earnings
disregarded ($9 + $30 + Y3($90 - $9 - $30)). On the other hand, if work expenses are
deducted after the application of the $30 and one-third rule, the recipient may disregard
$59 ($30 + V3($90 - $30) + $9). Of course, this differential becomes more important as the
work expenses increase.
74 For example, a family which spends $100 on child care, $30 on work clothes, and $50
on taxes will receive $60 more under the former method than under the latter.
75 Eleven states had waiting lists, either statewide or in one or more localities, in 1947.
See E. BURNS, supra note 9, at 323. Since July 1, 1951, aid has been required to "be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1970). This
change was added pursuant to the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act. Act of Aug.
28, 1950, ch. 809, § 321, 64 Stat. 551.
76 In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court ruled that the maximum
imposed by Maryland on a family's welfare benefit was not prohibited by the Social Security
Act, even though the maximum was substantially less than the standard of need for large
families. The plaintiffs argued that a maximum violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution (as well as the supremacy clause). The Court held that, so long as there is some
"reasonable basis" for a state law or regulation, there is no violation of the equal protection
[Vol. 59:825
1974] CHANGES IN AFDC
Some states continue this practice today. Another early method
which is still used today is to pay a percentage of the difference
between the family's countable income and its need.7 7 A third
method is to calculate the difference between income and need and
then pay all families this difference less some stipulated amount.
Recently, as will be described below, some states have adopted the
practice of reducing the standard of need itself and paying families
the full difference between income and the reduced standard.7 8
Although it may appear unreasonable that states should set
cost standards and then give families less than the amount that they
need according to those standards, a useful purpose is served by
such a practice. By making the cost standard, which is used to
determine eligibility, high relative to payment levels, the state can
spread limited funds among more people. That is, the state can
make relatively small payments to a large number of families. 9
C. Cost Standards
The procedures used by the states to determine how much
total income a family needs to achieve a satisfactory standard of
living have become increasingly standardized. In the early days of
the program, a family's income requirements were determined by
asking each family how much it spent for food, clothing, housing,
and other items. The discretion given the caseworker and the
clause merely because the law is imperfect or unwise. Id. at 485-87. The Court gave great
weight to Maryland's finite financial resources and found that this, coupled with other
"legitimate state interests," provided a "reasonable basis" for the limit on benefits. Id. at
483-84, 486, 487.
7 For a description of the use of both of these methods during the program's first
decade, see E. BURNS, supra note 9, at 326-31.
78 In July 1972, 13 states paid the full difference between countable income and the
cost standard; 10 states paid a percentage of the difference; 18 states imposed a maximum
limit on the payment; one state reduced payments by a flat amount which varied by family
size; and 18 states used a reduced cost standard. See generally U.S. Dep't of Health, Education
& Welfare, State Maximums, Other Limitations, and Effect of Federal Matching Provisions
on Public Assistance Money Payments, July 1972, Feb. 14, 1973 (NCSS Report D-3).
7' Two of the methods used to limit payments also have the side effect of lowering the
marginal tax rate on income. If recipients with no income are paid a maximum amount
which is less than the cost standard, their income can increase with no reduction in the
payment they receive until their countable income equals the difference between the
maximum and the cost standard. This means that they are taxed at a zero rate within this
range. The tax rate is also reduced if recipients are paid a percentage of the difference
between their countable income and the cost standard. Because they are only paid a
percentage of this difference, their payment is only reduced by a percentage of an increase
in their countable income. Reducing the payment by a percentage of the increase in income
is equivalent to taxing income at that percentage. In sum, the tax rate on income is lowered
below 100% both by disregarding some items of income and by limiting payments in these
two ways.
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resulting inequities in treatment led the Federal Bureau of Public
Assistance in 1947 to require the states to establish standards for
the income needed to purchase basic consumption items. Over the
next two decades, states established cost standards for food, cloth-
ing, personal care, and, in some states, for rent and other shelter
costs. These standards generally varied according to the size of the
family and the age, sex, and activities of its members. Considerable
discretion and complexity remained, however, and in 1966 HEW
required that the states establish a single cost standard for all basic
items except shelter, with variation only by family size.80
The development of cost standards has not, however, removed
all discretion from the caseworker. Many states recognize "special
needs," such as special diets and transportation expenses, that arise
for people in specified circumstances. Payments for special needs
are made in addition to payments for basic needs and provide the
flexibility to help families in unusual circumstances. Because reli-
able data are not collected on special needs, it is impossible to
determine their importance as a share of total AFDC payments.
While HEW regulates theform of the states' cost standards, at
no time has it regulated their level. In 1967, however, Congress
required the states to update their cost standards to allow for
changes in the cost of living. According to section 402(a)(23) of the
Social Security Act, each state must
provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to
determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to
reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were
established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted. 8'
States are not required to continue updating their cost standards
for inflation occurring after that date.82 The responses of the
0 For a description of the development of cost standards, see Winston & White,
Simplifying Need Determination in Public Assistance, 5 WELFARE IN REV. 1-5 (1967). Some states
continue to vary standards according to the age of the family members.
81 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970).
82 Id. Compliance with the amendment would require increased state expenditures of
widely varying amounts. Requiring states to update their cost standards for inflation
occurring "since such amounts were established" means that some states would have to
increase standards by more, over the long run, than others. States which had recently
increased their standards by amounts less than the increase in the cost of living would have
to update less than states which had not recently updated and which would therefore have to
update by an amount equal to the full increase in the cost of living. Furthermore, the
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states, HEW, and the courts to this congressional mandate are
described here. While these responses are only a small chapter in
the history of AFDC, they are discussed in detail because they
illustrate the reluctance of government to pursue policies which
increase welfare costs.
The impact of section 402(a)(23) on the case load and on
payments could have been staggering, because many states had not
recently increased their cost standards to keep pace with the rising
cost of living. Undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Wilbur Cohen, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee in
1967, said that only twenty-five states had increased their standards
within the previous two years and several had not changed their
standards in ten yearsA83 Increases in the standard would have
made more families eligible, and if no restrictive compensating
action were taken, such increases also would have raised payments
to families already on the rolls.
HEW's desire to update cost standards did not survive the
change in administrations. The Nixon Administration was reluc-
tant to force the states to increase their cost standards at a time
when welfare was already a growing financial burden and sweeping
reforms were under consideration. The July 1, 1969, deadline for
updating passed with little response by the states, and of the states
which did respond, many did so incorrectly or inadequately. On
July 25, 1969, HEW, after prodding from the National Welfare
Rights Organization, listed thirty-nine states which had failed to
comply with HEW's terms on updating.s4 Only in October 1969 did
HEW give the states its interpretation of section 402(a)(23) and list
the acceptable methods for determining the required increase in
standards. The agency remained reluctant, however, to take action
amendment takes no account of the variation in the level of prevailing benefits. Thus, if two
states are required to update their standards by the same percentage, a high-benefit state will
have to increase standards by a larger dollar amount than a low-benefit state. In this way,
greater dollar increases in expenditures are required of states already making high payments
than are required of states with low payments. In spite of the differential impact on the
states, there was not much resistance by the states on the grounds that the amendment was
inequitable. As the following discussion will show, states have been so successful in avoiding
the major thrust of the amendment that they have not bothered contesting the details. See
notes 83-107 and accompanying text infra.
83 Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 259 (1967) (statement of W. Cohen, Undersecretary, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare).
84 Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A Case Study
in Welfare Administration, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1970).
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
against the noncomplying states. "[E]ssentially, the administrators
were engaged not in implementing the law but in effectuating a
delaying action. 85
The October memorandum to the states left them with consid-
erable discretion in interpreting the updating requirement and
with the opportunity to devise ways of avoiding it. States desiring to
resist making additional payments in response to the updating
requirement had several approaches from which to choose, al-
though it was not known whether any of them would be permissi-
ble. For example, in October 1967, twenty-seven states imposed a
maximum on the amount that could be paid to a family and five
paid a percentage of the difference between countable income and
the cost standard. Four states paid the full difference between
income and a percentage of the cost standard. 86
States have interpreted section 402(a)(23) in several ways. All
states eventually increased their cost standard, or what will be
called below the "full" cost standard. In order to avoid a larger case
load and higher benefits, however, many states have changed their
method of determining payments and, indirectly, their method of
determining eligibility. These changes have permitted states to
reduce payments if they wish and to restrict eligibility. Welfare
recipients have responded by challenging the states in the courts,
and the issue has reached the Supreme Court twice, in Rosado v.
Wyman 87 and Jefferson v. Hackney.8
Rosado v. Wyman, decided in April 1970, arose out of a change
in the method by which New York computed the needs of welfare
recipients. New York had calculated need as the sum of "basic
needs," which reflected only the number and age of the children in
the family, and "special needs," which varied according to the
particular circumstances of the individual family. In 1969, it
adopted a system fixing maximum allowances per family based on
the number of family members. These maximums did not take into
account the amounts which had previously been given for special
needs, although a routine quarterly lump-sum payment was insti-
tuted in lieu of special needs grants. The net effect was to decrease
benefits by about $40 million. 89
In its decision invalidating the New York procedure, the
85 Id. at 1156.
86 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MONEY PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS OF
SPECIAL TYPES OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, OCTOBER 1967 at 24, table 4.
87 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
88 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
89 397 U.S. at 407.
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Supreme Court made a distinction between changing the cost
standard and changing the level of benefits. It ruled that section
402(a)(23) required states to increase cost standards, and that New
York's lower standard therefore was not permissible. 90 But from an
examination of the section's legislative history, the Court could find
no clear indication that Congress intended states to increase benefits.
Congress had indeed rejected several amendments which
would clearly have required increased benefits and instead chose
language which was ambiguous. 91 But if states were not required to
increase payments, what was Congress's purpose in updating the
standards? The Supreme Court concluded that
[i]t has the effect of requiring the States to recognize and accept
the responsibility for those additional individuals whose income
falls short of the standard of need as computed in light of
economic realities and to place them among those eligible for the
care and training provisions.92
In short, updating standards is supposed to increase the number of
eligible families.
In order to avoid making higher payments, states could pay
less than full need. They could continue to use maximums, pro-
vided that these were updated, or they could use a percentage
reduction, also called a "ratable reduction." As the Court stated:
A "ratable reduction" represents a fixed percentage of the stan-
dard of need that will be paid to all recipients. In the event that
there is some income that is first deducted, the ratable reduction
is applied to the amount by which the individual or family
income falls short of need.9
But in response to the updating requirement, many states started
to apply a ratable reduction to the standard itself instead of to the
difference between income and the standard. They reduced the
standard by some percentage and then made payments equal to the
difference between income and this reduced standard. Obviously
such a procedure could completely nullify the requirement that
states update their cost standards.
90 Id. at 416, 419.
91 As the Supreme Court stated eloquently, the intention of Congress could not be
inferred from the legislative history of the bill:
The background of § 402(a)(23) reveals little except that we have before us a
child born of the silent union of legislative compromise. Thus, Congress, as it
frequently does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the courts to
discern the theme in the cacophony of political understanding.
Id. at 412.
92 Id. at 413.
93 Id. at 409 n.13 (emphasis added).
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HEW supported this procedure, even though it appears to be
in direct conflict with the. meaning of section 402(a)(23). In January
1970, the Department issued State Letter 1074, which recognized
that states were using a reduced standard and requested that states
report both the "full" standard and the "payment level" or reduced
standard.94 States were given permission to compute the payment
by comparing countable income to either the standard or the
payment level. In taking this action, HEW accepted the states'
method of avoiding the use of the updated standard.
HEW maintains that the full, and presumably updated, stan-
dard is used to determine eligibility and that the lower standard is
used to determine the payment. It can thereby claim that states
with two standards are complying with Rosado v. Wyman, which
requires that states update their standard of eligibility but does not
require them to increase payments.95 HEW defines the full stan-
dard as
the amount with which income from all sources is compared to
determine whether or not [initial] financial eligibility exists. Use
of the full standard for this purpose . . . is mandatory only for
AFDC applicant families with earned income who have not
received assistance in any of the four preceding months. 96
Families which have not received AFDC within four months are
not permitted to deduct $30 and one-third of remaining earnings
when comparing income to the full standard. 97 If their countable
income before the earnings disregard is less than the full standard,
they are considered eligible. According to this HEW definition,
"eligibility" does not mean that a family receives a payment, but
only that it can deduct $30 and one-third of remaining earnings in
determining whether it should receive a payment.98
The payment standard is defined as "the amount from which
94 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, State Letter No. 1074, Jan. 8, 1970 (on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
95 397 U.S. at 412-15, 419.
96 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Public Assistance Programs: Standards
for Basic Needs, July 1972, May 14, 1973, at 12 (NCSS Report D-2).
V7 See note 67 supra.
98 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 96, at 12. The rationale for
this distinction is based on the concept of the $30 and one-third disregard as a work
incentive for welfare recipients and not as an additional benefit for the working poor who
are just over the eligibility limits. For example, if a state's full standard is $200 per month, a
family which earns $225 per month would not be eligible for AFDC since it would not be
eligible for the income disregard. However, if a member of a family which was already on
AFDC began earning $225 per month, that family could still receive AFDC until its earned
revenue level reached the break-even point. See note 67 supra.
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income 'available for basic needs' is subtracted to determine the
amount of assistance to which an individual or family is entitled."99
Income available for basic needs is income less all permitted deduc-
tions, including the $30 and one-third earnings disregard. The
state may pay all or part of the difference between the payment
standard and income available for basic needs.
If the full standard is higher than the payment standard,
which is the case when a ratable reduction is applied to the cost
standard, a family which is eligible according to the full standard
may not receive any payment. This situation will result when the
family's income less disregards except the $30 and one-third disre-
gard is less than the full standard, but its income less all disregards
is greater than the payment standard. 10 0 A state may therefore
update the full cost standard by the required amount, but deny
payments to some families whose incomes are below the full stan-
dard. The legality of a ratably reduced cost standard came before
the Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Hackney,' 0' decided in May 1972.
The Court held that a reduced cost standard was consistent with
section 402(a)(23).10 2 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, indicated that the Court was unconvinced by the argument
made in Rosado that, if the legislation is to have any meaning, the
effect of updating cost standards is to increase the number of
eligible families:
The cost-of-living increase that Congress mandated would, of
course, generally tend to increase eligibility, but there is nothing
in the legislative history indicating that this was part of the
statutory purpose.... The Court [in Rosado] mentioned widened
eligibility simply as one of several possible effects that might
follow from the statute as so construed.'0 3
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the purpose of section 402(a)(23)
stated in Rosado was to require the states to "lay bare the extent to
which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need; [and] ...
to prod the States to apportion their payments on a more equitable
'9 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 96, at 12.
"o0 For example, suppose the full standard is $400 per month and the payment
standard is $200 per month. Assume further that the family earns $360 per month. The
family would be "eligible" in the sense that it could deduct $30 of its earnings and one-third
of the remainder in calculating its countable income. With this disregard, the family has
countable income of $220 per month ($360 - $30 - Y3($3 6 0 - $30)). But this is $20 more
than the payment standard, and the family, although "eligible," will not receive any benefit.
101 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
102 Id. at 539-45.
103 Id. at 543-44 & n.11 (emphasis in original).
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basis." 10 4 A ratably reduced cost standard, he argued, both exposes
the level of unmet need and apportions the limited welfare benefits
more equitably than the former system of maximum grants.' 0 5 But,
as the dissenters pointed out, a state which increases its cost
standard and then determines both payments and eligibility on the
basis of a reduced standard has done nothing more than a "mean-
ingless exercise in bookkeeping."' 0 6
Although the updating requirement was contravened, the
AFDC benefit schedule has been significantly and effectively
liberalized since 1967. Many states increased their cost standards
without compensating measures to limit payments, and all states
with maximums increased them. As a result, payments to families
with no income have increased in most states, and the income levels
at which families become eligible have increased in all states. The
most dramatic changes in the benefit schedule are due to the $30
and one-third earnings disregard, which has raised the earnings
level at which families leave the program above the full cost
standard, by a considerable amount in some states. Between 1967
and 1972, the earnings level at which families leave AFDC doubled
in about twenty states and increased by more than fifty percent in
many others. 10 7
IV
SOCIAL SERVICES AND TRAINING
While some social services have always been given to AFDC
recipients in the process of administering the money payments,
Congress did not provide for federal financial support of such
social services until 1956. The 1962 amendments to the Social
Security Act liberalized the federal matching provisions and per-
104 Id. at 542.
105 Id. at 543.
106 Id. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court was also asked to rule on a second
issue. The standard for AFDC recipients is reduced to 75% of the full standard while it is
reduced only to 95% of the full standard for the blind and disabled and not reduced at all
for the aged. The plaintiffs claimed that this differential violated the equal protection clause,
because the proportion of AFDC recipients who are black or Mexican-American is higher
than the proportion of recipients in the adult categories. The Court did not regard the
statistical evidence as establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the
equal protection clause.
107 See generally U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, supra note 96; Lurie,
Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Changes in the AFDC Program, 1967-1971 in JoINT
ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES IN PUPLIC WELFARE (Comm. Print 1973).
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mitted HEW to require the states to provide certain minimum
services.' 0 8 Services could be provided both to recipients and to
people who were likely to become recipients. The 1967 amend-
ments broadened the program of services that states were required
to provide. These provisions emphasized services which would
increase the employment of welfare recipients. Services such as
employment counseling, job referral, employability testing, and day
care were to complement the WIN program and the $30 and
one-third earnings disregard. The states were specifically required
to offer family planning information and services.' 0 9 Because the
states might not have the ability to provide services in sufficient
quantity, they were given permission to purchase services from
other sources, including government agencies and private
organizations."10 The amendments also required that services for
AFDC families be furnished by the same organizational unit as that
providing child welfare services.'''
Traditionally, caseworkers in welfare agencies have adminis-
tered money payments and provided social services as a single
function. As the caseworker inquired about the family's financial
situation, he would learn about its problems and attempt to help
solve some of them. In providing social services, caseworkers often
would gain additional information about the eligibility of the family
and factors which could affect the amount of its payment. With the
increased interest of professional social workers in working with
welfare recipients and with the amendments providing the funds to
pay them, the combined administration of payments and services
began to appear undesirable. Trained social workers want to pro-
vide services, not compute welfare benefits, and the need to make
welfare agencies attractive to them prompted HEW to favor sep-
aration of the administration of payments and services. Social
workers also felt that their effectiveness would be reduced if
recipients believed that information given to them could be used to
reduce their payments or remove them from the rolls.
During the late 1960's, HEW encouraged separation by fund-
ing numerous demonstration projects. Although separation initially
was voluntary, most states were willing to take some steps toward
1'8 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 101, 76 Stat. 173-82.
109 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. II, § 201 (a)(1)(G), 81 Stat. 877 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (1970)).
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (13), 603(a)(3) (1970).
"I Id. § 602(a)(15)(F).
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separation.112 Administrative regulations issued by HEW made
separation mandatory beginning January 1, 1973." 3
The 1962 amendments increased the federal matching share
of expenditures for services to seventy-five percent, available on an
open-ended basis. 1 4 Federal expenditures for services grew slowly
in the early 1960's, but accelerated rapidly during the end of the
decade, rising from $230 million in 1968 to $535 million in 1970
and then to approximately $1.7 billion in 1972. Faced with pro-
jected expenditures of $4.7 billion in 1973, 1" Congress imposed a
$2.5 billion ceiling on federal outlays for social services.1 1 6
It is difficult to determine to what extent these increased
expenditures for services actually represent increased services pro-
vided to AFDC recipients. HEW staff members admit that these
figures seriously overstate the amount of services delivered, and
that most of the caseworkers' time is still spent determining eligibil-
ity and payment levels. The federal government pays seventy-five
percent of the states' expenditures on services but only fifty percent
of expenditures for administration,'" 7 so that states have an incen-
tive to bill caseworkers' time as services instead of administration.
Consequently, the actual amount of caseworkers' time devoted to
services remains unknown.
Two other features of the federal law cause these data on
expenditures to overstate the increase in services provided to
welfare recipients. First, the federal government will fund services
for people who are not on welfare but who are potential recipients.
Second, services can be purchased from other government agencies
and from private organizations. As a result, funds for social ser-
12 HEW reported that in April 1971, 16 states had completely separated the provision
of services and payments and an additional 14 had achieved "substantial" separation. Only
three states had reported no progress in this organizational change. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SERVICES TO FAMILIES
RECEIVING AFDC 9-10 (1971).
,13 45 C.F.R. § 205.102 (1973). Separation is defined as "the administration and
operation of the services function independently from the assistance payments function,
with separate lines of authority for each function." Id. Coordination between the two
functions is provided by the requirement that a single person at the state level be responsible
for both.
114 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, §§ 101(a)(2), (b)(2)(A), 76 Stat. 174,
180 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3) (1970)).
115 These expenditure data are from Hearings on Open-Ended Federal Matching of State
Social Service Expenditures Authorized Under the Public Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act
Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1972).
16 The ceiling was imposed in an amendment to the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
117 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)(B) (1970).
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vices under the public assistance titles can be used for services
provided outside the welfare agencies that have little direct impact
on welfare recipients. For example, funds can be given to correc-
tional institutions and drug treatment centers even though the
majority of the people served by those funds are not on welfare. In
some places funds can be used to purchase day care services for
women who are not on welfare. Published data do not permit an
estimate of the extent to which expenditures for services are being
used to help people who are not on welfare, but non-welfare
services outlays may have become considerable in the past few
years.
The effectiveness of social services in reducing welfare depen-
dency has yet to be conclusively demonstrated. Even if all the
expenditures billed as services were actually being used to provide
services, they may have had little impact. on the case load. One
study found that social service activity in Wisconsin is "little more
than a relatively infrequent, pleasant chat. It is somewhat sup-
portive. It is rarely threatening but also not too meaningful in the
sense of either helping poor people get things they need or in
changing their lives."'118 Caseworkers were found to be useful in
helping recipients take advantage of the Medicaid program, but
had little else of a tangible nature to offer them.11 9 Recipients'
employability seemed unaffected by the services. 2  Other evalua-
tions of the effect of services on welfare recipients confirm these
findings.1 2 1
Increasing emphasis is being placed on training AFDC recip-
ients in an attempt to reduce their need for welfare. Community
work and training programs established in 1962 provided em-
ployment and training for welfare recipients, but states were not
required to establish programs and few recipients participated.
The WIN program established in 1967 was applied mandatorily to
the states and, as discussed above, to certain AFDC recipients. 2 2 It
was designed to provide on-the-job training, institutional and work
experience training, work projects for people for whom a regular
job cannot be found, and direct referral to jobs for people who do
not require training. Coupled with the $30 and one-third earnings
11 J. HANDLER & E. HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING POOR," A STUDy OF WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION 127 (1971).
119 Id. at 126.
120 Id. at 151-53.
121 For a discussion of several other evaluations of social services, see S. LEVITAN, M.
REIN & D. MARWICK, supra note 49, at 26-35.
12' See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
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disregard, it was expected to increase the employment of welfare
recipients significantly.
Experience with the WIN program has been disappointing to
its framers. Only a small proportion of recipients were referred to
the program. 123 Fewer were actually enrolled in WIN projects-
only 317,000 people between October 1968, when the program
began, and September 1971. Projects providing institutional train-
ing, including remedial education, have been most common. Few
participants have received on-the-job training, and there has been
almost no emphasis on creating jobs through special work
projects.1 24
Of the 200,000 people who were no longer in the WIN
program as of September 1971, the vast majority had not com-
pleted it successfully. Only one-fifth of the enrollees, 43,000, were
placed in jobs and were considered to have successfully completed
the program by remaining employed in the three-month to six-
month period of 'job entry."'125 Furthermore, some people placed
in a job did not earn high enough wages to move them off the
welfare rolls. From the beginning of the program through June
1972, 46,700 families left welfare because of employment or in-
creased earnings due to participation in WIN. More than half of
these families were receiving AFDC under the unemployed father
segment and therefore were headed by a male.' 26 Families headed
by women, which comprise the bulk of the welfare .population, had
only a slim chance of being brought out of welfare dependency by
the WIN program.
The Talmadge amendment, t 27 stimulated by dissatisfaction
with WIN, makes several significant changes in the program. The
requirement that recipients register for the program has been
described above. 28 To encourage the states to provide the suppor-
tive services recipients need to participate in the program, the
'21 See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
124 S. LEVITAN, M. REIN &c D. MARWICK, supra note 49, at 84-88, 97.
25 Id. at 97. The period of job entry, as defined by the Department of Labor, is the
period after enrollees are placed in a job but before they terminate the program.
126 These data refer to people who left welfare within six months of completing their
training, or roughly during the period of 'job entry." See generally U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, Assessments Completed and Referrals to Manpower Agencies Under
Work Incentive Program for AFDC Recipients, July 1969-June 1972 (NCSS Report E-5) (on
file at the Cornell Law Review). Data for the July-September 1970 quarter were not reported
and were interpolated from the preceding and following quarters.
217 Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. I, 1972)).
12' See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
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federal matching share for supportive services, including child
care, is increased from 75 percent to 90 percent, and states are
financially penalized if they provide supportive services to less than
15 percent of the people who register.12 9 To place greater em-
phasis on employment-based training, at least 33 percent of WIN
expenditures must be for on-the-job training and public service
employment. 130 Finally, in order to encourage private employers to
hire WIN participants, they are given a tax credit equal to 20
percent of wages paid to WIN participants in the first year of
employment, provided those participants are retained on the job
for a second year.' 3 ' There has as yet been insufficient experience
with "WIN II," as it is called, to determine whether it will be
effective in reducing AFDC recipients' need for assistance.
V
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AFDC
Welfare administration traditionally has been a function of
local government. Today, state governments administer the AFDC
program in thirty states; in twenty states the program is adminis-
tered by the counties under the supervision of the states. 132 In both
cases, however, contact with applicants and recipients is made by
the local welfare offices, which often have considerable control over
how the program is administered. The ultimate administrative
responsibility rests with the caseworkers who have direct contact
with the applicants and recipients, and in some localities they are
given considerable discretion in determining whether families are
eligible for assistance and the amount of their payments. As a
result, there are wide variations in the rules and procedures for
determining eligibility and payments, both among and within
states.
A. The Simplified Method of Eligibility Determination
The development of cost standards has considerably simplified
the process of computing benefits. Fewer changes have been made
in the procedure for obtaining information about applicants and
recipients. Information is generally obtained by questioning appli-
cants and recipients when they come to the welfare agency and by
129 42 U.S.C. § 603(c), (d)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
130 Id. § 31(b).
131 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 50A, 50B.
132 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 22, at 1.
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visiting their homes and attempting to verify the information they
provide.133 But this highly individualized treatment is costly, and in
1969, HEW required the states to test the "simplified method" of
determining eligibility. The distinguishing features of the
simplified method are that the statements of the applicant or
recipient are to be accepted as true and are to be obtained by an
application form, not a personal interview. However, concern over
the large number of ineligible families receiving AFDC and the
high rate of over-payment led HEW, in 1973, to revoke the
regulations requiring eventual adoption of the simplified
method. 34
B. Quality Control
Decentralization, the wide discretion given to caseworkers, and
the cumbersome methods used to obtain information from appli-
cants and recipients provide considerable opportunity for error in
determining eligibility and payments. In an effort to maintain this
error within tolerable limits, HEW requires that the states have a
system of "quality control." Quality control is the systematic review
of the accuracy or quality of caseworkers' decisions on eligibility
and payment levels. According to HEW, quality control is not
designed to identify fraud by individual families in order to prose-
cute them. "It is concerned with individual case errors in the case
sample only insofar as they reflect problems in overall agency
administration that require corrective action."'135 As quality control
in industry is designed to maintain the quality of the product being
produced, so quality control in welfare is supposed to maintain and
improve the administration of the program. Separate procedures
have been developed to deal with fraud, which will be discussed
later.' 36
States were first encouraged to have a quality control program
in 1964, after a nationwide review of the eligibility of AFDC
"I In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court ruled that the periodic home
visits by caseworkers in connection with AFDC were a reasonable administrative tool, which
served a valid and proper administrative purpose. Such visits are not unwarranted invasions
of personal privacy and violate no fourth amendment rights. The termination of assistance
to a recipient who refuses to permit a caseworker in the home is therefore proper. Id. at
317-18, 324-25.
13- For another account, see Lurie, supra note 107, at 95-96.
135 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, QUALITY CONTROL IN PUBLIC
AssISTANCE (QC MANUAL) I-1 (1972).
136 See notes 153-58 and accompanying text infra.
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families found that 5.4 percent of them were ineligible.137 For the
remainder of the 1960's, quality control consisted primarily of
checking a sample of the caseworkers' records to determine
whether the correct decisions had been made on the basis of
information contained in the record. Recipients generally were not
reinterviewed to check the accuracy of information in the record.
At the end of the decade, it became clear that quality control
was not detecting inaccuracies in determinations of eligibility and
payments. A quality control study in New York City in 1969 found
an ineligibility rate of 1.2 percent, but the General Accounting
-Office reinterpreted the data and found a rate of 10.7 percent.138
As a result of this study and others, HEW revised the quality
control system that states were required to use. Adoption of the
new system was required by October 1970.
The new system is described in the manual on quality control
prepared for the states by HEW. According to the manual, quality
control consists not only of analysis of case records but of investiga-
tions of the accuracy of information provided by applicants and
recipients as well.' 39 A sample of active cases and of negative case
actions (rejections or terminations) is drawn every six months by
the state, and a full field investigation is required for all active cases
in the sample. The investigator must visit the home of the recipient
for an interview. He can obtain information from the recipient's
relatives, landlord, employers, past employers, school records, and
probation department, or from the motor vehicle department, the
Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the
employment service, and credit bureaus. The term "investigation"
is an appropriate one. The recipient's word is not to be accepted as
true, and investigators are encouraged to utilize all these sources of
information in order to discover if the recipient is hiding resources,
earnings, or other factors which might make him ineligible or
change his level of benefits. Investigators should talk to recipients
and analyze their behavior to obtain "leads" for further investiga-
17 Vernier & Mugge, Findings of the AFDC Eligibility Review, 1 WELFARE IN REv. 1
(1963).
138 General Accounting Office, Report to the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
Monitoring of Special Review of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in New York City,
Conducted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the New York State
Department of Social Services, Oct. 17, 1969, in Hearings on Problems in Administration of
Public Welfare Programs Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1972).
139 See generally QC MANUAL, supra note 135.
19741
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tion. The recipient's consent for securing this collateral informa-
tion should be obtained, but collateral sources of information can
be consulted without the recipient's consent if the information
sought is necessary for a definitive determination of eligibility and
payment. 140
The review of terminated cases and denied applications does
not require a field investigation if examination of the case record
indicates that the termination or rejection was appropriate. A field
investigation is required only if analysis of the case record does not
substantiate the correctness of the action. In contrast to the review
of active cases, which can reveal overpayments and ineligibility
which are costly to the government, the review of rejected or
terminated families reveals incorrect decisions in which only the
family loses. Although the quality control reviewer should notify
the local agency when an error is discovered so that the agency can
notify the family to reapply, quality control is more concerned with
saving the government money than with providing welfare to all
people who qualify.
The system is supposed to determine both the extent to which
recipients are ineligible and assistance is erroneously denied to
eligible persons and the extent of overpayments and underpay-
ments. HEW requires that the states keep the rates of error
discovered below certain "tolerance limits.' 4 1 The limits are set at
three percent for eligibility errors and five percent for payment
errors.1 42 When the rate of error exceeds these limits, the states
must change their programs to improve the accuracy of their
decisions.' 43
States have been slow to implement the quality control system.
Two years after quality control became mandatory, one-third of
the states did not have fully operational systems.' 44 Furthermore,
the rates of error are considerably greater than the "tolerance
limits" set by HEW. In March 1972, 6.8 percent of the families
receiving AFDC were found to be ineligible.' 45 Overpayments were
140 Id.
141 Id. at IV-1.
142 Id.
143 Id. at IV-4 to -6.
U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare Press Release, Dec. 4, 1972. The General
Accounting Office reviewed the operation of quality control in eight states in 1971. Their
findings are reported in General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress, Problems in
Attaining Integrity in Welfare Programs, March 16, 1972, in Hearings on Problems in
Administration of Public Welfare Programs, supra note 138, at 17-20.
145 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare Press Release, Dec. 4, 1972.
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made to 13.8 percent of the families and averaged $45 a month.
Underpayments were made to 7.6 percent and averaged $27.146
The welfare agencies and the families were each responsible for
half of the errors made.' 47
This high rate of error led HEW, on December 4, 1972, to
announce that the federal government would no longer finance
payments made to ineligible cases and overpayments to eligible
cases. 148 The elimination of federal funding for these cases was to
become effective January 1, 1973, leaving the states virtually no
time for adjustment. Faced with a reduction in federal funds of
$689 million over an eighteen-month period, the states actively
opposed the new regulation. 49 HEW responded by amending the
regulation, which now provides that federal financing of payments
to ineligible cases and of overpayments will gradually be reduced
until January 1, 1975.150 At that time, no federal funds will be
available for payments involving error in excess of the quality
control tolerance limits.' 51 The new regulation also establishes the
principle that federal funds are only available for payments made
in accordance with the states' own eligibility standards. 152 Previ-
ously, federal funds were available to individuals who were ineligi-
ble under state standards but who would have been eligible if the
state standards were as broad as permitted by federal law.
C. Fraud
Responsibility for defining, preventing, and prosecuting fraud
rested entirely with the states during the first twenty-five years of
the federal public assistance programs. In 1961, in response to
press reports about fraud which could neither be substantiated nor
refuted, HEW issued guidelines for state policies and procedures
with respect to fraud. These guidelines required the states to
establish a policy to deal with fraud, although they did not specify
the details of such a policy. States responded with a wide variety of
definitions of fraud, administrative procedures, investigatory
methods, and other features of fraud control. As with most other
features of public assistance, the peculiarities of each state have led
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 37 Fed. Reg. 25,853 (1972).
149 Thirty-four states and jurisdictions hired a law firm to contest the regulation, a
highly unusual step. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1973, at 21, col. 3-4.
150 45 C.F.R. § 205A1 (1973).
151 Id.
152 Id.
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to wide variation in their concern about fraud and procedures to
deal with it.' 53
Since 1964, HEW has required the states to report annually on
their methods of dealing with recipient fraud and the number of
processed cases involving questions of fraud. States must report on
the total number of cases suspected of fraud, the cases referred to
law enforcement officials, and the cases prosecuted. They do not
report on convictions, so that it is not known how many families
were legally determined to have behaved fraudulently.
The data reported, if taken at face value, suggest that fraud is
not widespread in the AFDC program. In 1964, three percent of
AFDC cases were reported as involving a possible question of
fraud.1 54 By 1972, only two percent of the case load, or 58,850
cases, were so reported. In the latter year, the facts were sufficient
to raise a question of fraud in 30,036 cases, 17,125 cases were
referred to law enforcement officials, and only 7,583 were
prosecuted.1 55
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that these data
are not good indicators of the actual extent of fraud in AFDC.
Many agencies do not refer cases to law enforcement officials if the
amounts of money involved are small, if reimbursement can be
arranged, or if there is special hardship. Many law enforcement
officials do not prosecute for the same reasons. 56 The data on
fraud also appear to be of questionable accuracy when compared to
information obtained by the quality control investigations. In 1972,
2 percent of the AFDC case load was reported to involve a possible
question of fraud, and in about one-half of these cases the facts
were sufficient to support a question of fraud.15 7 Quality control
investigations in 1972 showed that 15.3 percent of the AFDC
families made some sort of an "error" in providing information to
the welfare agencies.' 58 Many of these errors do not constitute
fraud, but are unintentional mistakes made by poorly educated
people who are understandably confused by the complex rules and
procedures of welfare. The number of deliberate errors is un-
153 For a history of policies toward fraud, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, DEVELOPMENTS IN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF RECIPIENT FRAUD IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE 1951-1967 (1969).
154 Id. at 9.
... U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Disposition of Public Assistance Cases
Involving a Question of Fraud, Fiscal Year 1972, June 19, 1973, table I (NCSS Report E-7).
156 Id. at 6.
157 Id. table 1.
Is U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare Press Release, Dec. 4, 1972.
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known, but it seems unlikely that questions of fraud would account
for only 7 percent of the errors found by quality control, which
would be the case if the data on fraud reported to HEW were
accurate.
The inadequacy of the data lies not solely with the reporting
system but also involves substantive issues concerning government
policy toward fraud. A relatively passive policy toward fraud leaves
the AFDC program vulnerable to charges that fraud is widespread.
Welfare fraud can easily become a political issue, and ignorance
about the extent of fraud weakens public support for the program.
On the other hand, the development of a clear and uniform
definition of fraud and of enforcement procedures is hampered by
a reluctance to make criminals out of poor people who are trying to
get a few more dollars from an inadequate and inequitable welfare
system. Requiring caseworkers to refer all cases of suspected fraud
to law enforcement officials, regardless of special circumstances
surrounding the case, eliminates a type of caseworker discretion
that could be desirable. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies
are often unwilling to go through lengthy and costly prosecution
procedures for the small amounts of money involved in any one
case. These costs of exposing and prosecuting fraud help explain
the low rate of reported fraud in AFDC.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the structural changes in AFDC, one must
conclude that, on balance, they have contributed to the growth in
case loads and costs. Many of the criteria used to determine
eligibility have been broadened, cost standards have been raised,
the definition of income has been liberalized, and states have been
encouraged to increase their expenditures for services and train-
ing. In contrast, the WIN program, the Talmadge amendment,
and the quality control system have raised expenditures, but have
not, as yet, had a significant effect in reducing the size of the
program. It is therefore inaccurate to attribute the increase in
welfare dependency and costs solely to changes in the behavior of
the poor. Governments have been responsible also and deserve
their share of the blame or praise.
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